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NOTE
HEIGHTENED NOTICE MEANS HEIGHTENED
PROBLEMS: DUE PROCESS NOTICE CONCERNS
WHEN DISCHARGING STUDENT LOAN DEBTS
UNDER CHAPTER 13
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most college and graduate school graduates cringe when they hear
the words "student loans." Student loans are seemingly just as difficult
to avoid as they are to eliminate. For some unfortunate individuals,
overwhelming student loan debts are so great that they cannot be repaid.
These student loan debtors may have no choice but to resort to the
bankruptcy process for financial relief.
Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases allow most individuals with regular
income' to devise a plan by which to repay creditors out of the debtor's
future income.2 If the bankruptcy court approves the debtor's plan, the
payment of the debts pursuant to the plan will discharge most debts
provided for by the plan.3 Student loans, however, are non-dischargeable
without the debtor coming forward with evidence showing that failure to
discharge the student loans would create an extreme financial burden on
the debtor. The issue then becomes whether the bankruptcy procedure
rules require the debtor to commence an "adversary proceeding" 5 and
provide the creditor with personal notice to determine whether a student
loan debt may be discharged, or whether the debtor may discharge the
student loan debt in some other manner.
The United States Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue
have either held in favor of claim preclusion where a student loan debt is
discharged without litigating its dischargeability or in favor of allowing
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006).
2. BARRY E. ADLER ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 26 (4th
ed. 2007).
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a); see also id. § 523(a).
4. See id § 523(a)(8).
5.

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
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a creditor to attack a bankruptcy order which is violative of the creditor's
due process rights.6 A debtor's Chapter 13 plan which clearly apprises
the creditor: (1) of the debts which the debtor wishes to discharge; (2)
that subsequent confirmation by the court will satisfy the "undue
hardship" requirement of the bankruptcy code; and (3) of the potential
res judicata effect of its confirmation, satisfies minimal constitutional
due process requirements of notice and procedure.7 However, the plan
does not comport with the heightened due process privilege afforded to
creditors by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Bankruptcy
Rules"), 8 and such failure to comply with the clear language of the rules
renders the order confirming the plan void.
This Note posits that the bankruptcy laws should not afford the
creditor heightened due process notice because the Chapter 13
bankruptcy process affords creditors ample opportunities to protect their
interests. 9 Part II provides a brief overview of the history of student
loans and how the government has promoted higher learning while
curbing potential abuses of using the bankruptcy courts as a vehicle to
avoid repaying hefty student loans. Part III provides a look at the
bankruptcy process with a focus on Chapter 13 cases. Part IV offers a
detailed description of the existing controversy between due process
rights and finality of judgments among the circuit courts. Part IV then
provides an alternative viewpoint of the controversy in light of the two
separate due process standards. Finally, Part V argues for resolution of
the dispute in favor of adopting minimal standards of due process notice
in Chapter 13 cases, over affording creditors greater procedural
protections.

6. See infra Part IV.A-D.

7. Under due process, notice and procedure requirements stem from different sources. The
due process notice required in a particular case is governed by the test set forth by Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), requiring "notice reasonably

calculated.., to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Meanwhile, the procedural requirement of due process
emanates from the balancing test set forth by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which
applied the following three-factor test: (1) the "private interest that will be affected by the official
action;" (2) the risk of erroneous decision making and likely value of additional procedural
safeguards; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would" impose. Id.
at 335.
8. The only means of discharge of student loans explicitly permitted by the rules is by way
of an adversary proceeding which requires service of process. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6), 7003,
7004.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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II.

HEIGHTENED NOTICE MEANS HEIGHTENEDPROBLEMS

A HISTORY OF STUDENT LOANS AND FINANCING EDUCATION

A.

A BriefIntroduction

Higher education provides today's youth with countless
professional opportunities. However, as with everything else in life,
there is a price to pay. When it comes to postsecondary education, that
price is a rather hefty one. According to the most recent survey
performed by the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
("NPSAS"), approximately
two-thirds (65.7%)
of four-year
0
undergraduate students graduate with some debt,' and the average
student loan debt amassed by those graduating students is $19,237."
Meanwhile, as more and more students seek graduate degrees, their
outstanding student loan obligations worsen. According to the study, the
average graduate student accrues $37,067 by graduation date, with an
average cumulative debt' 2 of $42,406.13 In fact, the average student loan
debt incurred by those graduating from a private law school is $83,181;
meanwhile, median gross starting salaries at public service organizations
are less than $40,000 per year.1 4 Considering these troubling statistics, a
student loan debtor who cannot secure a high-income employment
position may not be able to avoid relying on the bankruptcy courts for
individual financial relief.
B.

Government Financingof Education:National Defense Education
Act of 1958 and HigherEducation Act of 1965

The sources of student loans vary. While private student loans
existed as far back as the pre-Civil War era, 15 government secured
student loans are relatively new to our nation's history. The origin of
10. These figures exclude PLUS Loans, but include all Federal Stafford and Perkins Loans,
other federal and state government loans, as well as private lender loans. FinAid.org, Student Loans,
http://www.finaid.org/loans (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (referring to the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study of 2003-04).
11. Id.
12. Cumulative debt is described as total undergraduate debt plus total graduate school debt
accumulated. Id.
13. Id.
14. Letter from Carl C. Monk, Executive Dir., Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., to Hon. Mike George
Miller, Chair, House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, and Hon. Edward M. Kennedy, Chair, Senate
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, (Sept. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.aals.org/documents/millerkennedy2007.pdf.
15. See Kevin C. Driscoll Jr., Note, Eradicatingthe "Dischargeby Declaration"for Student
Loan Debt in Chapter 13, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1311, 1313 (citing Waters v. Cleland, 32 Ga. 633
(1861)).
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government secured student loans dates back to the passage of the
National Defense Education Act of 1958,16 which was created to
"encourage and assist in the expansion and improvement of educational
17
programs to meet critical national needs."'
However, the main event in government student loan history was
the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965 ("HEA"). 18 The HEA
started the trend toward students utilizing federal funds to finance their
education as opposed to using high interest private loans. 19 Among other
benefits of the act, the HEA is credited with the consistent rise in higher
education enrollment.2 0 This is partly due to the fact that government
secured education loans are made available to those students
who may
21
not qualify for credit under traditional credit standards.
C. Congress Responds to Student Loan Discharge
In 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, 22 a creation of Congress, concluded that filing under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") should be encouraged for
consumer debtors as an alternative to filing under Chapter 7.23 While
Chapter 7 cases can trace their roots back to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act
("Bankruptcy Act"), Chapter 13 became available to individuals as a
result of the 1938 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act ("Chandler
Act").24 The purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Act, and Chapter
7 cases, contrast with the motivations behind the creation of Chapter 13
cases. 25 In Chapter 7, individual debtors receive a "clean slate" from
previous financial burdens at the cost of surrendering nonexempt

16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 421-29 (1970) (repealed 1972).
17. Id.
18. Id. §§ 1071-87 (2000).
19. Driscoll, supra note 15, at 1313-14.
20. Id.at 1314.
21. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.14[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed.
rev. 2008) (citing Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. v. Segal (In re Segal), 57 F.3d 342 (3d Cir. 1995)).
22. "[T]he Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States [is] an independent
group of judges and private citizens" called "to evaluate the bankruptcy system and make
suggestions for reform." Seth J. Gerson, Note, Separate Classificationof Student Loans in Chapter
13, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 269,274 n.40 (1995).
23. Id. at 274.
24. Gerald F. Munitz, The Bankruptcy Power and Structure of the Bankruptcy Code, in
UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION 2007 35, 45 (Practising Law

Inst. ed., 2007).
25.

See ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-26.
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assets.2 6 Congress later gave individual debtors the ability to restructure
their debt obligations and maintain even their nonexempt assets by
offering Chapter 13 relief.27 Under Chapter 13, creditors receive a
percentage of their receivables from the debtor's future income.28
Creditors benefit since they will receive at least as much as they would
under Chapter 7 liquidation, and debtors benefit since they do not have
to surrender their assets, of which they likely place a greater value on
than any one of their creditors.2 9
In addition to encouraging Chapter 13 cases as an appropriate
alternative to Chapter 7 cases, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
noted some early concerns regarding the prospect of discharging student
loans pursuant to the liberal Bankruptcy Act then in place. 30 To address
some of these concerns, the Education Amendments of 1976 made
student loans secured by the government non-dischargeable for a period
of five years. 31 Implicitly, in providing a five-year provision, Congress
feared granting discharge to those individuals who recently graduated
and have not had an ample opportunity to secure a comfortable financial
position would encourage students to immediately seek relief from the
bankruptcy courts before paying off a significant amount of their student
loan debts.32 Moreover, Congress seemed to believe that the nondischarge provision safeguarded "the financial integrity of governmental
entities and nonprofit institutions that participate in educational loan
programs." 33
However, the 1977 House report 34 seemed to suggest otherwise.
The report included a study performed by the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") that documents findings that
demonstrate that between one-half to three-fourths of one percent of all
matured educational loans were discharged in bankruptcy.3 5 Congress
supported the provision which made secured government student loans
26. Id. at 25. The Bankruptcy Code provides a laundry list of assets that cannot become part
of the bankruptcy estate in Chapter 7 liquidation cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006).
27. ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-26.
28. Id.at 26.
29. Id.
30. Gerson, supra note 22, at 280-81.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
32. See H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 176-77 (1973) (displaying Congress's concern that
any discharges would discredit the system of advancing government secured loans).
33. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, at 523.14[1] (citing In re Renshaw, 222 F.3d
82 (2d Cir. 2000)).
34. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, pt. 1 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.S.C.C.A.N. 5963.
35. DEANNE LOONIN, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., No WAY OUT: STUDENT LOANS,
FINANCIAL DISTRESS, AND THE NEED FOR POLICY REFORM 29 (2006).
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non-dischargeable by advancing the argument that student loans differ
from other debt since the debtor obtains
an asset, a degree, which cannot
36
be taken away in the event of default.
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197837 which,
irrespective of the extremely meager discharge rates discovered by the
GAO study, severely limited the possibility of discharging an education
loan under Chapter 738 by incorporating the five-year provision into
section 523(a) of the Code. 39 This provision made student loans nondischargeable for five years unless the debtor could demonstrate that
excepting the debt from discharge would impose "undue hardship" upon
the debtor. 40 However, the non-discharge provision did not extend to
bankruptcy cases commenced under Chapter 13. 4 1 Eventually, in 1990,
Congress amended § 1328(a) to incorporate student loans as nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases absent a showing of "undue
hardship. 4 2 Additionally, Congress extended the five-year nondischarge period for student loan debts to seven years.43
In 1998, Congress amended the Code again when it deleted the
seven-year provision, "leaving 'undue hardship' as the sole basis for
discharging an educational loan or benefit., 44 Congress's fear of the
potential harmful effects of creating a provision that would make a
government secured student loan virtually non-dischargeable was
softened by the fact that they were able to provide students with recordlow interest rates on their loans.45 In fact, during the 105th Congress's

36. Id.
37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 259 (1978) (codified as
amended at II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2006)).
38. Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases discharge debts through liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 727;
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). The provision did not apply to
Chapter 13 cases (discharge by completion of plan payments, discussed infra) in 1978. Gerson,
supra note 22, at 282.
39. Gerson, supra note 22, at 281-82.
40. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 259 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330). Although there is no agreement among the courts of the United States as
to what the true definition of "undue hardship" is, the leading test is found in the Second Circuit's
decision in Brunner v. N.Y State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987). See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
41. Gerson, supra note 22, at 282.
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (incorporating §523(a)(8) and various other nondischargeable debts); Gerson, supra note 22, at 283.
43. See 1l U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006)
(deleting the seven year requirement)).
44. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, at 523.14[6].
45. See 144 CONG. REC. S 11069-71, 22,679-80 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Jeffords) (acknowledging that eliminating the seven-year provision may be problematic, but
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floor debates, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts mentioned
that the cost of college had risen 304% in the previous twenty years in
contrast to only a 165% inflation increase. 46
Finally, in 2005, Congress broadened the discharge exception of
§ 523(a)(8) of the Code to include "any other educational loan that is a
qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, '4 incurred by a debtor who is an individual.4 8
This amendment to the Code extended the non-dischargeable provision
to some loans that are not insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit
or under a program funded by a governmental unit 49 or non-profit
institution. 50 The issue then turns to how an education loan debtor may
seek to discharge his student loan debt. The next Part will demonstrate
how the Code and Bankruptcy Rules have sought to resolve that issue
and how such attempts at resolution appear to be ineffectual.
III.
A.

THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS

The Chapter 13 Confirmation Process

An individual debtor seeking relief from collection of student loans
may commence a bankruptcy case to obtain such relief.5 1 Although a
student loan debtor may seek relief under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13,52
Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases are more attractive to individuals seeking
discharge of debts since they provide that the debtor's assets are not
seized and liquidated.53 Furthermore, Chapter 13 provides the debtor

suggesting that the provision was a means by which Congress could achieve other objectives in
facilitating repayment of student loans).
46. Id. at 22,681 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006).
48. Id.Section 221(d)(1) defines a qualified education loan and indebtedness incurred solely
to pay for "qualified higher education expenses," which includes all costs of attendance: tuition,
fees, books, room and board, supplies, and other related expenses. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1) (2006); 20
U.S.C. § 108711 (2006).
49. The term "governmental unit" is defined by II U.S.C. § 101(27).
50. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, at 523.14[l].
51.

See 2 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 273-74, 276, 278 (7th ed.

1998). Also note that federal statute mandates that bankruptcy judges hear all core bankruptcy
proceedings, including (of most relevance to this Note) confirmation of plans and determinations as
to the dischargeability of particular debts. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I), (L) (2000).
52. For purposes of this Note, the commentary and analysis will focus on Chapter 13 cases
since they are the cases that sparked the controversy in the law regarding the appropriate notice
required to creditors before a student loan debtor is excused of his loan obligations.
53. Farris E. Ain, Comment, Never Judge a Bankruptcy Plan by its Cover: The Dischargeof
Student Loans Through Provisionsin a Chapter 13 Plan, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 703, 709 (2003).
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with broader discharge abilities than are offered under Chapter 7.54
Ultimately, the goal of Chapter 13 is to reorganize an individual's debts
by setting up a repayment plan of three years 56
for low-income debtors, 55
debtors.
and up to five years for higher-income
The debtor in a Chapter 13 case is responsible for moving the
bankruptcy process along.57 To commence a case under Chapter 13, the
debtor must file a petition with the bankruptcy court.58 The filing of the
petition under Chapter 13 automatically stays most actions against the
debtor or the debtor's property. 9
In addition to the petition, the debtor is obligated to file a Chapter
13 plan,60 which may be done with the petition or up to fifteen days after
the petition is filed. 6 1 Among other requirements, the plan must provide
for the submission of the necessary future earnings and income of the
debtor to the control of the trustee for the purposes of executing the plan,
as well as provide for
full payment of "all claims entitled to priority"
62
pursuant to the Code.
The United States trustee will convene a meeting of the creditors no
fewer than twenty days and no more than fifty days after the Chapter 13
order for relief. 63 At least twenty days after the meeting of the creditors,
but in any event no more than forty-five days after the meeting, the court
must hold a confirmation hearing for the Chapter 13 plan. 64 Any party in
interest may object to confirmation of the plan. 65 However, whether or
not there are objections, the court shall consider the plan for
confirmation.66
The bankruptcy court will then review the Chapter 13 plan to
ensure that it complies with the provisions of the Code, that it was
54. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, at 523.02.
55. Whether a debtor is considered one of low-income is determined by a specialized formula
added to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, which takes into account the debtor's monthly income. See
11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2006).
56. Id. § 1322(a)(4). A plan may not provide for payments over a period longer than five
years. Id. § 1322(d)(1); ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 621.
57. ADLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 621.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a). Petition is defined by the Bankruptcy Code to represent any petition
which commences a case under the Code itself. Id. § 101(42).
59. Id. § 362(a).
60. Id. § 1321.
61. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1)-(2); see id. § 507(a) (detailing priority order of expenses and
claims).
63. FED R. BANKR. P. 2003(a) (individual debt adjustment cases).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(b).
65. Id. § 1324(a).
66. See id.
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proposed in good faith and not by any unlawful means, and that "the
debtor will be able to make" all the scheduled "payments under the
plan." 67 If the proposed plan comports with these statutory requirements,
and there are no other statutory hurdles 68 to be met, the Code mandates
that the Chapter 13 plan be confirmed. 69 The confirmed plan binds the
debtor and each creditor to the terms set forth in the plan.7 °
The Bankruptcy Rules require that a creditor who wishes to object
to a Chapter 13 plan serve the objection on the debtor and the trustee
before the plan is confirmed. 7' However, should a creditor fail to raise a
timely objection, the bankruptcy court may determine that the plan was
proposed in good faith and not by any unlawful means, even if the
absence of any evidence supporting such findings.72 The Bankruptcy
Rules require a creditor who wishes to contest confirmation of a plan to
file an objection, and such objection is governed by the rules applicable
to contested matters initiated by motion.73
An unsecured creditor may also seek to modify the plan after
confirmation to increase monthly payments and reduce the time to make
such payment.74 Absent any objection by the debtor, the modifications
by the creditor shall take effect and become the new plan. 5 This
provides the creditor with another means of protecting its interest and
avoid being bound by the payment plan designed by the debtor.76
Unless the debtor executes a written waiver of discharge, the
bankruptcy court will grant the debtor a discharge of most debts
provided for by the plan after the debtor completes all of the payments
pursuant to the plan.7 7 Education loans are one type of debt excluded
from discharge upon completion of plan payments.7 8 Furthermore,
67. Id. § 1325(a).
68. The statutory hurdles are the exceptions set forth by II U.S.C. § 1325(b) (including if the
trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to the plan, given that the amount of the claim exceeds the
value of the property distributed under the Chapter 13 plan). If the value of the property distributed
under the plan matches the amount of the claim, the court will proceed with plan confirmation even
if the trustee or any unsecured creditor objects to confirmation. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(A).
69. Id.§ 1325(a). Note that the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[t]he court may issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 105(a).
70. Id.§ 1327(a).
71. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(f).
72. Id
73. See id. at 9014(a).
74. I1 U.S.C. § 1329(a).
75. Id. § 1329(b)(2).
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
78. Id. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a).
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§ 1328 of the Code provides that the court may revoke discharge within
one year after it is granted if such discharge was procured through fraud
not known (by the party seeking relief) at the time the discharge was
granted.79 If the aggrieved party knew of the fraud, relief still may be
sought from a confirmation order that was procured by fraud if the party
seeks such relief within 180 days after the date of entry of the order of
confirmation.8 °
The confirmation order becomes final ten days after entry of the
confirmation order should none of the creditors file an appeal. 81
Although the Code permits extensions of time for appeals to be filed, no
such extension is available to appeal from a confirmation order of a
Chapter 13 plan.82 Moreover, whereas the Bankruptcy Rules adopt the
time limits set forth by Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
such provision is
governing relief from judgments and orders,
inapplicable to orders confirming Chapter 13 plans.8 4
B. DischargeBy Way of the Adversary Hearing
Section 523(a)(8) of the Code provides the debtor with the ability to
discharge an otherwise non-dischargeable debt by demonstrating that
excluding student loan debt from discharge would impose "undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents., 85 An issue arises
because § 523(a)(8) does not provide any guidance on what procedural
vehicle a debtor must use to demonstrate undue hardship. The only
procedural rule that provides any guidance is Rule 7001 of the
Bankruptcy Rules, which provides that "a proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of a debt" is an adversary hearing.86

79. Id. § 1328(e).
80. Id. § 1330(a).

81.
82.
83.
"mistake,

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002(a).
Id at 8002(c)(1)(F).
This Rule provides that the court may relieve a party from an order that was the product of
inadvertence, surprise,. . . excusable neglect," or fraud if the party seeking relief moves
the court within a reasonable time, but in no event more than one year after the date of entry of the
order. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c)(1). Furthermore, the Rule also permits a party to seek relief from an
order that is void if the party seeking relief moves the court within a reasonable time. Id. at 60(b)(4),
(c)(1).
84. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee Notes state that time
periods established by § 1330 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1330, which governs appeal
from Chapter 13 plan confirmation orders, may not be circumvented by the time periods set forth by
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 advisory committee's
note.

85.

11U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

86. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
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Rule 4007 of the Bankruptcy Rules governs the procedure required
to determine the dischargeability of a debt., 7 Rule 4007, drafted in
permissive terms, provides that a "debtor or any creditor may file a
complaint to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of any
debt., 88 The Bankruptcy Rules require that a party seeking to determine
whether a debt is dischargeable must file a complaint with the
bankruptcy court. 89 Furthermore, the requirements of service of process
under the Bankruptcy Rules attempt to mirror those of Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; however, the Rules provide that
service by first class mail is an adequate means of serving a summons
and complaint. 90 This stark difference demonstrates the Bankruptcy
Rules' attempt to facilitate the commencement of adversary hearings.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Rules provide a means by which a debtor can
demonstrate "undue hardship" to satisfy the exception to nondischargeability under § 523(a)(8), but they fail to mention whether the
debtor is precluded from utilizing other procedural tools to accomplish
the same showing. It is this failure that provoked a great deal of
litigation 9l on the issue of whether a Chapter 13 debtor may discharge a
student loan debt, by inserting language in the plan that places the
creditor on notice that confirmation of the plan shall constitute a
determination of "undue hardship," or whether a Chapter 13 debtor must
commence an adversary hearing to discharge a student loan debt. The
next Part will outline the controversy among the United States Courts of
Appeals and provide an alternative to how this matter may be viewed, in
light of the two separate due process standards, and resolved in favor of
adopting minimal standards of due process notice instead of affording
creditors greater procedural protections.

87. Id. at 4007.
88. Id.at 4007(a).
89. Id.at 7003 (applying Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to all adversary
proceedings). Rule 3 provides that a complaint must be filed for a civil action to commence. FED. R.
CIv. P. 3.
90. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(a), (b). In addition, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

permit a clerk to sign, seal, and issue a summons electronically. Id at 7004(a)(2).
91.

See infra Part 1V.A-C.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Early Cases: The Ninth and Tenth Circuits' Commitment to
Finality of Judgment

1. In re Andersen
In the first of a barrage of cases regarding the discharge of student
loans, the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, in In re
Andersen ("Andersen"), held that a creditor who fails to object to a
proposed Chapter 13 plan and does not timely appeal the confirmation of
such plan may not collaterally attack the order of the bankruptcy court. 92
In Andersen, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 plan, which provided
language that confirmation of the plan shall constitute a finding of
"undue hardship" and render the debt dischargeable. 93 While the creditor
argued that such language is in contravention to § 523(a)(8) of the Code,
the Tenth Circuit held that the "'policy favoring the finality of
confirmation is stronger than"' the court's duties to "'verify a plan's
compliance with the Code.', 94 The Andersen court reasoned that there
must be finality of judgment to ensure that parties relying upon a
confirmation order, by taking actions subsequent to its issuance, are not
upset by later revocation of it. 95 In applying the doctrine of claim
preclusion, or to the determination of "undue hardship," the court argued
that a creditor may not "sit on its rights and expect that 96the bankruptcy
court... will assume the duty of protecting its interests."
2. In re Pardee
Just four months after In re Andersen, the Ninth Circuit followed its
sister circuit by refusing to allow a creditor to collaterally attack a
confirmed plan on the grounds that the interest discharge provision
violated the Code. 97 In In re Pardee("Pardee"), the student loan debtors
sought merely to eliminate the interest which accumulated on their
outstanding debt from the date the petition was filed, or "post-petition

92. 179 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled by In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033,
1051-52 (10th Cir. 2007). Although subsequently overruled, In re Andersen set off a wide ranging
debate within the circuits about discharge of student debt under Chapter 13 and is being cited for
that reason. See infra notes 119, 123, 125 and accompanying text.
93. Andersen, 179 F.3d at 1254.
94. Id.at 1258 (quoting In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1406 (3d Cir. 1989)).
95. Id. at 1259.
96. Id.at 1257.
97. In re Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
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interest., 98 They sought to achieve discharge of post-petition interest by
drafting a plan that provided for such interest to be discharged upon
confirmation of the plan. 99 Unlike the plan in Andersen, the plan in
Pardee failed to include "undue hardship" language, since the debtors
agreed to pay the entire balance of the student loan accrued prior to the
filing of the petition.' 0 0
The Pardee court agreed with the rationale supporting the decision
in Andersen and held that the creditor "'must take an active role in
protecting its interests."' 1 The Ninth Circuit held that it had previously
recognized, in various other bankruptcy cases, the importance of finality
in confirmation orders even when they confirm bankruptcy plans
containing illegal provisions. 0 2 The court concluded that a confirmed
plan constitutes "'res judicata as to all issues that
could have or should
03
have been litigated at the confirmation hearing.""
B. Creatinga CircuitSplit: In re Banks and Its Progeny
1. In re Banks
The Fourth Circuit, through its holding in In re Banks ("Banks"),
refused to follow the lead of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.' 0 4 Like the
debtors in Pardee,the debtor in Banks sought to discharge post-petition
interest by inserting language in the plan which stated that upon
discharge he would only be liable for the unpaid balance of his prepetition debt. 10 5 The Banks court refused to grant preclusive effect to the
confirmed Chapter 13 plan since the court ruled that the debtor failed to
give specific notice to the creditor of the debtor's intent to discharge the
underlying student loan debt, thereby violating the creditor's due process
rights. 10 6 The court held that while a confirmed order is generally
entitled to preclusive effect, it is not entitled to such effect when a
creditor's Fifth Amendment Due Process rights are violated.' °7 In
dismissing the Chapter 13 plan as a means to discharge a student loan
98. Id.at 1084-85.
99. Id. at 1085 & n.5.
100. See id. at 1085 n.5.
101. Id. at 1086 (quoting In re Andersen, 179 F.3d at 1257).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1087 (quoting In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916, 925 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998)).
104. 299 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2002).
105. Id.at 298-99.
106. Id.at 302.
107. Id. (citing Piedmont Trust Bank v. Linkous, 990 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1993), in which a
creditor successfully moved to revoke a Chapter 13 plan when the debtor sought to convert it to a
Chapter 7 plan, thus implicating the creditor's due process rights).
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debt, the Fourth Circuit expressed concern about the holdings of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, since the number of debtors seeking to
discharge otherwise non-dischargeable debt had increased in the years
subsequent to the decisions of Andersen and Pardee.'0 8 Such a policy
concern appeared to weigh heavily on the Fourth Circuit's ultimate
decision. Summarizing its position on due process notice in Chapter 13
cases, the Banks court held that discharging 0a9 student loan debt requires
the commencement of an adversary hearing.'
2. The Seventh, Sixth, and Second Circuits Follow Banks
In 2005, the once minority view present in Banks became the
popular approach as some of the other circuit courts adopted and0
furthered the due process arguments advanced by the Fourth Circuit."1
The tide was quickly turning against finality principles in favor of
constitutional due process rights.
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Hanson ("Hanson"), extended the
ruling in Banks to principal pre-petition student loan debt discharged by
a confirmed Chapter 13 plan."1 In Hanson, the student loan debtor's
plan provided for repayment of nineteen percent of the balance on his
loan over a period of sixty months, or five years. 1 2 Like the Fourth
Circuit, the Hanson court acknowledged the strong policy argument
favoring finality of orders, but ultimately felt that the "dictates of due
process trump policy arguments about finality." ' 1 3 The court commented
that it was Congress's "unmistakable intent" to make education loan
of a showing of "undue hardship"
debt non-dischargeable in the absence
14
discharge.
seeking
by the debtor
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in In re Ruehle ("Ruehle")," 5 held that
"discharge by declaration," or the inserting of language into a plan that
confirmation shall constitute a finding of "undue hardship," is void and
subject to being set aside by motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4) by a creditor seeking relief from the confirmation
order. 16 In Ruehle, the student loan debtor proposed a plan whereby she
108.

In re Banks, 299 F.3d at 301.

109.

ld.at 303.

110.

In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1046 (10th Cir. 2007).

111. 397 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 483.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at486.
Id.
412 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 684. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) provides that upon motion by a party, the court may

relieve such moving party from any final judgment, order, or proceeding that is void. Note that Rule
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would pay five percent of her loans over a period of forty months, and
that completion of the payments would constitute a finding that said debt
is dischargeable. 1 7 The Ruehle court was convinced that the Banks and
Hanson decisions represented an "evolving majority view" that
discharging student loan debt via a bankruptcy plan is invalid and
void.' 18 The fact that the Andersen and Pardee courts did not consider
due process concerns also weighed heavily into the Sixth Circuit's
ruling.' 19 Finally, the Ruehle court held that there was no balancing of
interests in the case, but rather there was a clear "denial of fundamental
rights."'12
Roughly six months later, the Second Circuit became the fourth
circuit to require a debtor to affirmatively secure an "undue hardship"
determination by adversary hearing before any student loans could be
discharged. 12 1 In Whelton v. Education Credit Management Corp., the
student loan debtor's plan provided that confirmation of the plan would
constitute a finding of undue hardship. 22 The Whelton court firmly
disagreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits' holdings that a creditor's
failure to object to a plan or to appeal its confirmation operates as a
123
waiver of its right to collaterally attack the order confirming the plan.
The Second Circuit opined that a discharge of a student loan without
filing an adversary proceeding to establish "undue hardship" is in
contravention to the clear language of the Code. 124 The court concluded
that the debtor's failure to comply with § 523(a)(8) of the Code and
initiate adversary proceedings via service of
a summons and complaint
25
1
void.
plan
the
of
confirmation
the
rendered

60 is made applicable in bankruptcy cases by FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024. Rule 9024 also provides
certain limitations to Rule 60. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024.
117.
118.

In re Ruehle, 412 F.3d at 681.
Id.at684.

119. See id.
at682.
120. Id.at 685.
121.

Whelton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2005).

122.

Id. at 151-52.

123.

Id. at 153-54.

124.

Seeid. at 154-55.

125. Id.at 156.
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C. Drawingthe Battle Lines: The Ninth and Tenth Circuits Go Their
Separate Ways
1. Andersen Overruled
In 2004, in In re Poland ("Poland"), the Tenth Circuit showed
signs of retreating from its previous position in favor of discharging
student loans via confirmation of Chapter 13 plans as opposed to via
commencement of adversary proceedings. 126 In Poland, the Tenth
Circuit examined a Chapter 13 plan which provided that student loans
would be discharged upon completion of the plan payments, but lacked
language advising the creditor that confirmation of the plan would
constitute a finding of "undue hardship."' 127 The court held that the lack
of such language was fatal to the debtor's defense of res judicata on the
issue of "undue hardship.' ' 128 The Poland court acknowledged that the
doctrine of res judicata would preclude a collateral attack of the
confirmation order if there was a finding of undue hardship, whether
judicial or otherwise. 129 Despite the court's acceptance of detailed
Chapter 13 plans as a means to discharge student loan debt, the court
issued an advisory that the "proper way" to discharge such debt is by
way of an adversary proceeding in which the debtor establishes "undue
hardship."

130

Finally, in 2007, the Tenth Circuit officially overruled Andersen
with its decision in In re Mersmann ('Mersmann"), ending Andersen's
reign as the circuit's position on Chapter 13 plans and their preclusive
effect. 131 In Mersmann, the Tenth Circuit held the practice of
establishing "undue hardship" by inserting language into a Chapter 13
plan to be violative of the Bankruptcy Code and not entitled to res
judicata effect. 132 The Mersmann court reasoned that: (1) Congress
evinced the unmistakable intent to make student loans "'presumptively
nondischargeable;"' (2) discharging student loan debt without any
adversary hearing is contrary to § 1328(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code;
and (3) confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan requires that the plan be
consistent with the rest of the Code. 133 The court placed the burden of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
(2004)).

382 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1187-89.
Id. at 1188.
See id. at 1188-89.
ld. at 1189.
505 F.3d 1033, 1051 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1047-48 (quoting Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450
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establishing claim preclusion on the party asserting it (the debtor) and
concluded that the debtor could not satisfy all the elements of res
judicata134 in order to support its application in the case.1 35 This decision
ultimately left the Ninth Circuit hanging by a thread as the only circuit
court to currently allow the discharge of a student loan debt via
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. The next Part will demonstrate how
the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan discharging student loan debt does
not violate a creditor's constitutional due process rights and why the
bankruptcy procedural rules should permit such notice36 to commence a
proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt.1
2. The Ninth Circuit's Retreat from Pardee
Five years after Pardee,the Ninth Circuit began to give credence to
the due process argument first advanced by the Fourth Circuit in
Banks. 137 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit held in In
re Repp ('Repp") that a debtor seeking to discharge student loan debt
would have to render notice to the creditor of the Chapter 13 case which
was substantially similar to the notice required for commencement of an
adversary hearing. 138 In Repp, the confirmed plan in question provided
language that confirmation would constitute a finding of "undue
hardship" and that completion of payments pursuant to the plan would
discharge the entire loan.1 39 In rendering its decision, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel adopted the due process notice test, as stated in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 140 that "[n]otice must be
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to

134. The Tenth Circuit applied the elements of res judicata as established by Nwosun v.
General Mills Restaurants, Inc., which requires the proponent of claim preclusion to demonstrate:
(1) the prior suit must have ended with a judgment on the merits; (2) the parties must be
identical or in privity; (3) the suit must be based on the same cause of action; and (4) the
plaintiff must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the prior suit.
124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997).
135. In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1049-50.
136. The analysis of whether the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan discharging student loan
debt violates a creditor's basic constitutional due process rights differs dramatically from the
analysis of whether the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code permit
such a discharge. See infra Part IV.D.2. This Note focuses on the dichotomy of these two standards.
137. In re Repp, 307 B.R. 144, 153-54 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel is an inferior court to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and therefore may not
overrule any Ninth Circuit decisions and its decisions are not binding on the Ninth Circuit.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 147.
140. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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object."' 14 ' The court concluded that "the method chosen for notice was
calculated to minimize the chance that it would come to the attention ' of
42
persons in the position to make litigation decisions for the creditor."'
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed
the order
143
confirming the Chapter 13 plan on due process grounds.
One year after its decision in Repp, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
of the Ninth Circuit faced another Chapter 13 student loan case whereby
the debtor sought discharge of post-petition interest on a student loan via
plan confirmation. 144 The debtor in In re Ransom ("Ransom") devised a
Chapter 13 plan whose language was vague and ambiguous and failed to
reasonably place the creditor on notice that it would constitute a
discharge of the debtor's post-petition interest on the underlying student
loan debt. 45 The rationale of the Ransom court echoed that of Repp as
the court concluded that the terms of the Chapter 13 plan were too
ambiguous to place a creditor on notice that confirmation of the plan
would effectively discharge the debt. 46 Once again, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel held that the plan must be served in a manner similar to
that which commences an adversary proceeding. 147 The Ransom court
failed to expound on its ruling and refused to offer examples of notice
that would comport with the due process standard.
In 2007, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit faced
this same issue in light of a debtor who commenced a Chapter 13 case to
discharge liability for pre-petition property taxes. 148 In In re Brawders
("Brawders"), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel acknowledged that while
§ 1327 of the Bankruptcy Code allows even illegal provisions of a
Chapter 13 plan to have binding effect on the creditor, claim preclusion
does not apply to a claim "that was not within the parties' expectations
of what was being litigated.' ' 149 The Brawders court further held that
"considerations of due process mandate great caution and require that
the creditor receive specific notice" and an "opportunity to litigate one141.
142.

In reRepp, 307 B.R. at 149 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
Id.

143. Id.at 154. Note that Judge Ryan of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel issued a
well-reasoned dissenting opinion that expressed concern that the majority holding does not comport

with the ruling in Pardee,which is binding authority. Id at 154, 156 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
144.
145.

In re Ransom, 336 B.R. 790, 792-93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
See id The plan provided that no post-petition interest on the outstanding student loan

would accumulate, but did not mention "undue hardship" at all. Id.
146. Id. at 798.
147. See id.
148. In re Brawders, 503 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2007).
149. In re Brawders, 325 B.R. 405, 410-11 (B.A.P.9th Cir. 2005), affd,In re Brawders, 503
F.3d at 859.
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on-one."' 150 The court concluded that the plan was void since the creditor
did not receive clear notice and the procedural protections required by
due process. 5 1 At this time, the overwhelming trend in the Ninth Circuit
dictated that it was only a matter of time before the Ninth Circuit
overruled Pardee outright and followed the coattails of the other circuit
courts that place the due process rights of parties before the interests
supporting finality ofjudgments.
3. PardeeAffirmed on Both Statutory and Due Process Grounds
However, in December, 2008, the Ninth Circuit finally set its
position on the issue by affirming its decision in Pardee. The Ninth
Circuit, in Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 152 held that a
student loan creditor, which received actual notice of debtor's Chapter
13 case and was notified of the consequences of failing to object to a
proposed plan through which debtor sought to discharge his student loan
obligations, was not denied due process, despite the fact that the creditor
was never served with a summons and complaint.153 In Espinosa, the
debtor created a plan of repayment for his student loan debts and, within
the plan, warned the creditor of the fact that the discharge amount was
less than the outstanding balance on the loan and that if the creditor did
not object to the plan, it would be confirmed and the debts would be
discharged. 54 However, the creditor failed to raise an objection to the
debtor's plan, and therefore the bankruptcy court granted the
debtor a
55
discharge upon successful completion of the plan payments.1
The Ninth Circuit found the holding in Pardee to be more
persuasive than the position taken by the other circuits.' 56 The court
criticized the creditor's apparent willingness to benefit from the debtor's
Chapter 13 plan, but unwillingness to face the consequences of sitting on
its rights. 57 Unlike the preceding cases, the Ninth Circuit in Espinosa
dismissed the relevance of the heightened notice requirement for an
adversary proceeding since there was no adversary proceeding in the
case.158 Finally, the court held that the Due Process Clause does not
150.
Brokers,
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

In re Brawders, 325 B.R. at 414 (quoting Varela v. Dynamic Brokers, Inc. (In re Dynamic
Inc.) 293 B.R. 489, 497 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003)).
Id.
at 417.
No. 06-16421, 2008 WL 5158728 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *6-7.
Id at *8.
Id at*9.
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generally require heightened notice and therefore actual notice was
sufficient to adequately protect the creditor's rights.159 In supporting
Pardee on due process grounds, the court gave more strength to the
Pardee decision and answered the critique of the Sixth Circuit in Ruehle
that the Ninth Circuit did not consider the due process consequences of
granting the debtor a discharge without an adversary hearing. 160 Having
justified its holding on statutory and constitutional grounds, the
court
16 1
enforced the underlying discharge order of the bankruptcy court.
After the Espinosa decision, the split among the United States
Courts of Appeals remains intact, eventually leaving the issue up to the
Supreme Court, if fate permits such a destination. However, until such
time, the following Parts discuss how the split among the courts may be
resolved.
D. Due ProcessProblem of Sufficient Notice and Opportunity to Be
HeardAre Resolved
1. A Chapter 13 Plan Drafted With Specificity Provides Proper
Notice to Creditors
A Chapter 13 plan which clearly outlines the outstanding
obligations the debtor is seeking to discharge, places the creditors on
notice that confirmation of the plan will constitute a finding of "undue
hardship" and advises the creditors that an order by the bankruptcy court
confirming the plan constitutes res judicata as to all issues that could
have been litigated by an adversary hearing, satisfies the minimal notice
requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The procedures mandated by the Bankruptcy
Rules ensure that each creditor is clearly apprised of the pendency of the
action and given an
opportunity to present any objections which the
62
1
have.
may
creditor
The Fifth Amendment safeguards against deprivation of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."' 63 During the process of
distilling just what the Framers of the Constitution meant by the due
process clause, the United States Supreme Court determined that the

159. See id.
160. See supra note 119-20 and accompanying text.
161. Espinosa, 2008 WL4426634 at *10.
162. The United States Supreme Court decision in Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust
Co. set forth the governing due process notice test. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The elements of the
test are set forth in note 7, supra.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Due Process Clause affords individuals with two distinct privileges. 164
The first privilege of due process hinges on the level of notice that must
be given to an individual before any of his liberty or property rights may
be adjudicated. 165 This privilege determines whether a court has
jurisdiction over the person whose rights are being adjudicated in the
underlying action. 166 The second protection afforded by the Due Process
Clause prohibits adjudication of an individual's rights unless the proper
procedures are in place to enable the individual to adequately protect his
rights. 167 This privilege scrutinizes the entire procedure collectively from
initiation of the168legal proceeding to the entry of final judgment and
through appeal.

The issue now arises as to which privilege should be examined for
purposes of determining whether a summons and complaint and an
adversary hearing is necessary before a debtor may discharge an
otherwise non-dischargeable debt. Since most of the Courts of Appeals
that hold that discharging student loan debt via confirmation of a
debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan is violative of due process concerns
of notice rather than procedure, this Note will focus its attention on the
due process notice requirement as set forth by the Supreme Court in
Mullane. 169 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has shown its bias toward
applying the notice requirement standard set forth in Mullane' 70 rather

164. Note that although the privileges are distinct in application, they are not mutually
exclusive. See supra note 7. Both the notice and procedural privileges afford a party a fair
opportunity to be heard and a method by which to state their objections. It is their similarities that
often cause confusion among courts as to which standard to apply when the due process rights of a
party are implicated by a particular proceeding. See supra Part IV.A-C.
165. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
166. Id. at 311-12 (referring to in personam jurisdiction implications of notice under the
doctrine set forth by Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977)). Pennoyer held that power, consent, and notice are the three
requirements for a court to properly exercise jurisdiction over a person. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 145 (6th ed. 2004).
167. The test for this privilege is set forth by the Supreme Court decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge,424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The three-factor test is set forth in note 7, supra.
168. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-34, 342-43, 345-49.
169. The two standards both scrutinize the procedural safeguards afforded parties so that they
may have their objections heard. See supra note 164. Therefore, if a particular procedure satisfies
the due process procedural requirement, it will likely also satisfy the due process notice
requirement.
170. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (requiring "notice
reasonably calculated.., to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections").
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than the very complex balancing
test 17 1 for procedural due process as set
72
1
forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.
Before this Note attempts to apply the Mullane test to a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case, we must analyze the objective and goals furthered by
the standard. In Mullane, the Supreme Court considered the due process
notice rights of beneficiaries of a common trust fund when the trustee
sought judicial settlement of its accounts as trustee. 173 The Supreme
Court reasoned that notice by publication to those beneficiaries of whose
residence was known by the trustee failed to comport with the
Fourteenth Amendment's 1 74 minimal requirement of due process
notice.1 75 The Supreme Court determined that the right to be heard
demands that one be informed of the existing action against him and
have the opportunity to decide whether to appear or default. 176 Further,
the Mullane Court held that the "notice must be of such nature as
reasonably to convey the required information" and simultaneously must
grant "a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance. '' t 77 Finally, the Supreme Court set forth the due process
notice standard ("Mullane Test") by holding that "[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to
be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency' ' 78
of the action
objections."
their
present
to
opportunity
an
them
afford
and
The Mullane Test's reasonableness standard leaves its application
subject to a case-by-case analysis. One clear maxim of Mullane is that
publication notice is frowned upon where a party's address is known.
However, it is not clear whether receipt of notice is always necessary to

171. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (holding that to determine what process is due in a specific
action, the court must balance the following three factors: (1) "the private interest that will be
affected by the official action;" (2) the risk of erroneous decisionmaking and likely value of
additional procedural safeguards; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the purpose of the
action along with the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would" impose).
172. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002) (citing numerous examples
of Supreme Court decisions employing the Mullane test to resolve issues dealing with due process
notice requirements).
173. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309-11.
174. Note that Mullane examined the notice given under the Fourteenth Amendment since the
publication notice was enacted pursuant to a state statute as opposed to a federal law, which would

implicate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See id. at 309-10.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 320.
Id. at314.
Id.
Id.
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satisfy due process. 179 Therefore, there are cases where personal
service
80
is not necessary to notify a party that an action is pending.'
In the world of bankruptcy, application of the Mullane Test
provides no serious obstacle. Three years after Mullane, in City of New
York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail Road, the Supreme
Court faced a bankruptcy case involving known and unknown
creditors.' 8' Adopting the same principles set forth in Mullane, the City
of New York Court held that known creditors should be provided with
actual written notice of a debtor's bankruptcy filing, while notice by
publication82 provides an adequate means of notifying unknown
creditors.
However, when dealing with Chapter 13 plans discharging
otherwise non-dischargeable debt, the due process notice analysis is far
more intricate. First, as mentioned in Part II of this Note, debtors
generally move the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case along, as opposed to
other creditor-driven cases.' 83 This places creditors in an unfavorable
position insofar as their ability to ensure their rights are safeguarded.
Second, the Bankruptcy Rules suggest that a debtor seeking to discharge
a debt file a complaint. 84 Finally, student loan debts can be quite hefty,
as seen in Part I of this Note, and therefore the creditors have much at
stake when a plan is confirmed. Therefore, it is essential that a creditor's
due process notice rights are sufficiently protected.
By inserting clear language in the Chapter 13 plan which places
each creditor on notice of the way each debt will be paid off and of the
rights of the creditor that are at stake, and by mailing a copy of said plan
to the creditor, the debtor ensures that a creditor's minimal due process
notice rights are adequately protected. In the simplest terms, the mailing
of the plan to the creditor apprises the creditor of the pending action and
allows the creditor to present objections.

179. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489-91 (1988).
180. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 171 (2002), in which the Supreme Court
stated that previous due process cases "have never required actual notice." Id. The Supreme Court
defined actual notice as "'notice given directly to, or received personally by, a party."' Id. at 169 n.5
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (7th ed. 1999)).
181. 344 U.S. 293, 294 (1953).
182. Id. at 296; see PacifiCorp v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 05-764, 2006 WL 2375371, at *3 (D.
Del. Aug. 16, 2006).
183. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Note that for purposes of this sub-Part, the
focus is on whether serving a plan upon a debtor satisfies due process notice requirements, not
whether such practice satisfies the procedural requirements set forth by the Bankruptcy Rules. The
latter serves as the focal point of the following sub-Part.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37:225

A Chapter 13 creditor, upon receipt of the debtor's proposed plan,
has a plethora of procedural vehicles to ensure that its rights are
protected. First and foremost, the creditor may file a complaint to
determine the dischargeability of the debt in question. 185 Second, the
bankruptcy trustee is required to hold a meeting of the creditors after the
filing of the plan. 186 Thus, the creditor is apprised of the action and given
ample opportunity to take action. Assuming no action by the creditor is
taken, the creditor is still given notice of a hearing by which the
bankruptcy court will consider the debtor's plan for possible
confirmation.18 7
Furthermore, the creditor may object to the proposed plan before
confirmation of the plan.18 8 The creditor takes on an obligation to object
to confirmation of a plan if such creditor believes the plan inadequately
provides for its claim. 189 Moreover, the creditor may attend the
confirmation hearing and proffer evidence demonstrating any defects in
the debtor's proposed plan. 190
Finally, even after the payments are completed and the order
confirming the plan is entered, the creditor has ten days from the entry of
the order to file a timely notice of appeal. 19 1 Although the argument
exists that ten days is not ample time to decide whether to appeal
confirmation of the order and the bankruptcy courts generally do not
grant extensions of time to perfect notice of appeal in Chapter 13
cases, 192 the creditor is not left without any recourse beyond the ten-day
period. If the creditor believes the plan was procured by fraud, the
creditor may93attempt to revoke the confirmation order within 180 days
of its entry.1

These protections made available by the bankruptcy laws and their
procedural rules clearly safeguard a creditor's due process rights. If there
is any concern by any creditor that a debtor seeking discharge, as clearly
outlined in the Chapter 13 plan, is doing so in a fraudulent or unlawful
manner, or any other manner not prescribed by the bankruptcy laws for
that matter, the creditor has numerous opportunities to halt the debtor

185.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a).

186. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (2006).
187. Id. § 1324(a).
188. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(o.

189. In re Holmes, 225 B.R. 789, 793 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
190. Id.
191. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002(a).
192. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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194
from obtaining a discharge by having its objections heard.
Furthermore, the mailing of the Chapter 13 plan to each creditor clearly
is actual notice of the pendency of the action and is reasonable
considering the circumstances. Even if one argues that this notice is
unreasonable since a summons may better alert the creditor of the
pending action, the subsequent notice to the creditor of the confirmation
hearing and entry of the confirmation order certainly place the creditor
on notice that its rights are at stake and it should take action to protect
those rights.
Although the Tenth Circuit in Andersen advances a cogent
argument that a creditor shall not sit on his rights and expect a
bankruptcy court to assume the duty of protecting those rights,' 95 the
Bankruptcy Rules actually place duties on the bankruptcy courts to
ensure a creditor's rights are protected nonetheless. First of all, the
debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan undergoes scrutiny by the bankruptcy
court prior to confirmation. 196 More specifically, the bankruptcy court
will ensure that the plan complies with the provisions of the Code, that it
was proposed in good faith and by no unlawful means, that the debtor
will be able to make all payments in accord with the plan, and that the
action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good faith, among other
requirements. 197 Although some may argue that some bankruptcy courts
do not strictly adhere to this principle and simply "rubber-stamp" a
debtor's proposed plan, when analyzing the due process provided to
creditors, the mere existence of such a procedural protection alone
furthers the argument that the creditor's rights are adequately protected.
Furthermore, the Code gives the court broad discretion to issue orders
that may further the interests of the Code itself, thereby providing the
bankruptcy court with an additional vehicle by which the court can
including a creditor's due
ensure that the rights of any interested party,
198
process rights, are effectively safeguarded.
Furthermore, the Code has a built-in safeguard against proposed
plans that procure confirmation by fraudulent means. 99 The Code
permits the court to revoke the discharge of any debt within one year of
such discharge if it was obtained by a debtor's fraudulent acts which
were not known to the creditor when the discharge of the debt

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
Id. §§ 1325(a)(1), (3), (6)-(7).
Id. § 105(a); see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e).
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occurred. 200 Although the court will not act on its own to revoke the
discharge of the debtor's obligations,2 °' it provides the creditor with
sufficient time to uncover any tortious behavior of the debtor and seek
relief from the court.
In conclusion, it is clear that the confirmation process as outlined
and defined by the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules provides a creditor in
a Chapter 13 case with sufficient due process notice and satisfies the
minimal requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The benefits of requiring
a debtor to serve a summons and complaint and to discharge a student
loan debt via an adversary hearing over merely requiring a debtor to
serve a Chapter 13 plan and to seek confirmation are minimal when all
the opportunities the creditors have to protect their rights are considered
in totality. After all, the Mullane Test demands an analysis of the notice
"reasonably calculated" to reach the parties involved, taking into account
"all the circumstances. 2 °2 Mailing a copy of the proposed plan which
outlines the debt in question, the payments the debtor wishes to make to
satisfy the debt, and the legal implications of confirmation of the plan to
the creditor is certainly reasonable and allows the creditor the ability to
protect his or her rights by interposing timely objections. It follows that
the Chapter 13 plan process affords creditors numerous notices of the
pending action and ample opportunities to be heard at various stages of
the case. These procedures certainly satisfy the constitutional minimal
requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard and should be
sufficient to satisfy the bankruptcy procedural requirements as well.
However, the promulgated Bankruptcy Rules provide the creditor with
heightened due process notice protections.
2. A Chapter 13 Plan Drafted with Specificity Does Not Comport
with the Bankruptcy Rules' Heightened Notice Requirement
Although a clearly drafted Chapter 13 plan may satisfy minimal
constitutional due process requirements,20 3 it does not comport with the
heightened notice afforded creditors by the Bankruptcy Rules.20 4 The

200.
201.
in order
202.

Id.
Section 1328(e) of the Code requires that a "party in interest" request relief from the court
for the court to effectively revoke a prior discharge of a debt. Id.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

203.
204.

See supra Part IV.D.1.
See FED R. BANKR. P. 4007(a), 7001(6), 7004(a) (allowing the dischargeability of a debt

to be determined by way of an adversary hearing, which requires service of a summons and
complaint).
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debtor must serve a summons and complaint and commence
an
20 5
discharged.
be
may
debt
loan
student
a
before
hearing
adversary
Congress granted the United States Supreme Court the "power to
prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under Title 11.,,206
Pursuant to the power granted by Congress, the Supreme Court
promulgated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007, which
provides that "[a] debtor or any creditor may file a complaint to obtain a
determination of the dischargeability of any debt." 20 7 The rules further
explain that a proceeding which determines the dischargeability of a debt
is known as an "adversary proceeding., 20 8 Adversary proceedings,
however, are not the only means by which a debtor may discharge
certain forms of debt.20 9
Nevertheless, student loans are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy
unless failure to discharge the debts would result in "undue hardship" on
the debtor and the debtor's dependents. 210 Although there is no uniform
standard for determining whether failure to discharge the debt would
result in "undue hardship," most circuit courts apply the three-step
approach set forth by the Second Circuit in Brunner v. New York State
Higher Education Services Corp.,z21 which requires the debtor seeking
discharge to demonstrate that: (1) the debtor cannot maintain a "minimal
standard of living" for the debtor and the debtor's dependents, if forced
to repay the loans; (2) "that additional circumstances exist" which
demonstrate that the debtor's situation will continue for a "significant
portion of the repayment period" for the loans; and (3) the debtor
exercised good faith in attempting to repay the loans.212 The Eighth
Circuit adopted a case-by-case analysis standard which, while not as
restrictive as the more burdensome Second Circuit test, proves very
205. Whelton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Ruehle,
412 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2005); In re Banks,
299 F.3d 296, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2002).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2000). Title 11 of the United States Code encompasses the entire
Bankruptcy Code.
207. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a).
208. Id.at 7001(6). Adversary proceedings, in general, are governed by Part VII of the
Bankruptcy Rules. Id.at 7001.
209. See II U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006) (referring to the relevant sections of the Code that provide
how a debtor may obtain discharge of a debt under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13). Under Chapter 13, a
debtor may discharge some debts by completing payments pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. See id.
§ 1328(a).
210. Id.§ 523(a)(8).
211. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
212. Id.at396.
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restrictive on debtors seeking a discharge. 1 3 Under the Eighth Circuit's
test, the bankruptcy court must conclude whether there would be any
remaining funds from the debtor's estimated future income so the debtor
may make payments on the loan and still maintain a minimal standard of
living for the debtor and the debtor's dependents. 21 4 Regardless of the
appropriate test, the "undue hardship" requirement of the Code creates a
giant hurdle for debtors seeking to discharge student loan debts.
Therefore, a debtor cannot discharge student loan debts by completing
payments pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.2' 5
The problem of discharging a debt by inserting language in the
Chapter 13 plan stems from the fact that bankruptcy courts confirm
plans discharging debts that are otherwise non-dischargeable. 21 6 The
Bankruptcy Rules offer little guidance on the issue of whether
discharging a student loan debt by confirming a Chapter 13 plan is
permissible. Proponents of the position that a student loan debtor may
discharge a debt by inserting language in the Chapter 13 plan that
confirmation of the plan constitutes a finding of "undue hardship" may
turn to Rule 4007(a) of the Bankruptcy Rules for support. Rule 4007(a)
permits, but does not require, a debtor to determine the dischargeability
of a debt by commencing an adversary hearing.2 17 Although this
reasoning seems to support the proposition that there may be other
procedural vehicles for a debtor seeking discharge of student loans, the
United States Supreme Court has dismissed such rationale as
meritless.2 18
The Supreme Court, interpreting the rules that it promulgated, held
that because student loans are not automatically dischargeable, the
Bankruptcy Rules require such a debtor to commence an adversary
proceeding to make a showing of "undue hardship."21 9 Since § 2075 of
Title 28 of the United States Code clearly states that the Bankruptcy
Rules may not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,, 220 but
does not speak to a party's procedural rights, the Supreme Court, in
extending a student loan creditor's minimal due process rights, did not
exceed its power as conferred by Congress. Therefore, in deferring to the
213. See In re Andrews, 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981).
214. In re Reynolds, 425 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing In re Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704).

215. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2).
216. See supra Parts IV.A-C (citing examples of circuit court decisions which resulted from

bankruptcy courts discharging student loan debts via confirmation).
217. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a).
218. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440,451 (2004).
219. Id.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2000).
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interpretation of the Supreme Court, it is clear that a student loan debtor
must serve a summons and complaint 221 and commence an adversary
hearing,2 22 by which the debtor must demonstrate "undue hardship, '223 to
discharge a student loan obligation.22 4
Given that a Chapter 13 plan, drafted with the requisite specificity
to satisfy a creditor's constitutional due process rights of notice, 225 does
not comport with the heightened notice afforded student loan creditors
under the Bankruptcy Rules, the next issue becomes whether a final
order discharging a student loan debt by confirming the Chapter 13 plan
is entitled to res judicata effect and incapable of being collaterally
attacked by a creditor claiming denial of due process notice pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Rules. The next sub-Part demonstrates how a confirmed
Chapter 13 plan should be awarded preclusive effect, but should be set
aside by a creditor claiming denial of due process rights, since an order
discharging an otherwise non-dischargeable debt is void as a matter of
law.226
3. Although the Elements of Res Judicata Are Capable of Being
Met Where a Bankruptcy Court Confirms a Chapter 13 Plan,
Such Confirmation Is Void and Capable of Being Set Aside
Claim preclusion may attach to a final order confirming a Chapter
13 plan that purports to discharge an otherwise non-dischargeable debt.
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, requires that: (1) the prior action ended
with a judgment on the merits; (2) the parties are identical or in privity;
(3) the suit is based on the same cause of action; and (4) the party being
precluded had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate in the prior
action. 227 As an affirmative defense, the defendant, or party seeking to
benefit from preclusion, bears the burden of setting forth facts sufficient
to satisfy the above four elements.22 8 A final order confirming a Chapter
13 plan constitutes a judgment on the merits since the Code provides
that such confirmation binds the debtor and each creditor on any and all

221.

See FED. R. BANKR. P.7003.

222. See id.
at 7001(6).
223. Remember that there are two tests for "undue hardship" adopted by the circuit courts
which both place a tremendous burden on the debtor. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying
text.
224. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part IV.D.1.
226. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
227. Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997).
228. Id.
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claims, whether stated in the plan or not.229 Furthermore, the parties

affected by the court's confirmation are the same parties involved in an
action by the creditor to set aside confirmation of the debtor's plan. In
addition, the action would involve the same claims of the creditor that
were discharged by the final order. Therefore, the first, second, and third
elements are met with ease.
In contrast, satisfaction of the fourth element of res judicata, that
the creditor had a "full and fair opportunity" 230 to challenge the
discharge of the claim, seems to pose a greater obstacle. To satisfy this
element, the debtor must show that the creditor had an opportunity to
challenge the discharge of the claim, not that the dischargeability of the
debt was actually litigated.2 3'
In determining whether the creditor had a proper opportunity to
challenge the discharge, the court must look to any existing procedural
limitations and the creditor's overall incentive to challenge the
discharge.2 32 In the case of Chapter 13 confirmation, the bankruptcy
rules provide the creditor with a myriad of procedural opportunities to
challenge the discharge of a student loan debt.233 For the same reasons
that a debtor seeking discharge via Chapter 13 plan confirmation renders
the affected creditor with sufficient notice for the creditor to come forth
with its objections,23 4 the lack of procedural limitations of the
confirmation process warrant the awarding of preclusive effect to a final
order confirming the plan.
Moreover, the student loan creditor likely has great incentive to
fully litigate the dischargeability of the debt. Although one may argue
that creditors are less likely to pursue their interests at the confirmation
hearing since the Code provides that student loans are non-dischargeable
by confirmation,2 35 it would behoove a creditor to refuse to object to a
debtor's proposed plan and risk confirmation of the plan which fails to
comport with the Bankruptcy Rules. Furthermore, once the Chapter 13
plan is confirmed, the need for the creditor to reject the plan is far more
urgent since there is nothing left for the court to do but grant the
discharge upon completion of the plan payments.2 36 Therefore, the fourth
prong of the res judicata test is satisfied.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2006).
Nwosun, 124 F.3d at 1257; see also supra text accompanying note 227.
See Jones v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 137 F. App'x 165, 167-68 (10th Cir. 2005).
Nwosun, 124 F.3d at 1257-58.
See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.D.1.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006); see also id. § 1328(a)(2).
See id. § 1328(a).
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The analysis does not end there, however. The issue yet to be
determined is whether the denial of a creditor's due process rights under
the Bankruptcy Rules may afford the creditor relief from the bankruptcy
court's final order, now entitled to preclusive effect, which discharged
the debtor's student loan obligations. The Bankruptcy Rules require that
a party seeking relief from a final order of the bankruptcy court serve a
motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.23 7 A
creditor claiming denial of due process notice is essentially attacking the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the person whose rights are being
adjudicated in the underlying action.238 Further, iit is arguable that
bankruptcy courts lack the subject matter jurisdiction to enter a
discharge order that violates due process principles. 239 The bankruptcy
court's lack of jurisdiction would render any final order granted by the
court as void as a matter of law.24 ° Under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the court, upon motion, may relieve a party from a
final order that is void. 24 1 Therefore, the void nature of the final order
permits the order to be set aside upon motion by the creditor if the
creditor was denied due process notice.242
Allowing a creditor to set aside a final order of the bankruptcy court
at any time the creditor pleases creates problems within the bankruptcy
system. A creditor who makes a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a final order that is void
must do so within a "reasonable time" after the order becomes final.243
The "reasonable time" restriction set by the Bankruptcy Rules, in
incorporating Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 244 is
ambiguous and appears to be lenient on creditors in light of the one-year
restriction placed on creditors setting aside a final order for other
237. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014, 9024.
238. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (examining the connection between due
process notice and in personam jurisdiction).
239. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (permitting the court to issue an order necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code); 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2000) (providing the
bankruptcy court with limited jurisdictional power).
240. See In re Ruehle, 412 F.3d 679, 684 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 485-86
(7th Cir. 2005).
241. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
242. See In re Banks, 299 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing numerous cases whereby a final
order of the bankruptcy court was set aside and the court refused to accord finality to it since the
debtor failed to provide appropriate notice and thereby violated a party's due process rights).
243.

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(c).

244. Although Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure lists exceptions to the
incorporation of Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the exception only deals with
Chapter 13 plans procured by fraud. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024(3) (referencing the Bankruptcy
Code's provision controlling the revocation of a confirmation order in a Chapter 13 case).
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reasons, such as mistake, neglect or newly discovered evidence. 245 The
next sub-Part tackles this concern over disturbing a bankruptcy court's
final order discharging a debt, and proposes a solution to the policy
concerns which stem from the conclusion that the mailing of a clearly
drafted Chapter 13 plan comports with minimal notions of due process
notice.246

E. Public Policy Concerns over the Denial of a "FreshStart" to
Debtors Do Not Outweigh the Benefit Derivedfrom Discouraging
Overzealous Advocacy by Failingto Grant Confirmed Chapter13 Plans
PreclusiveEffect
1. The Need to Ensure a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Applies with Less
Force in Chapter 13 Cases
It is well-settled that the main goal of bankruptcy is to provide
debtors with a "fresh start" free from prior obligations.247 The idea is to
give the debtor a new opportunity in life with a clean slate, unburdened
by "oppressive indebtedness" which caused the debtor to file for
bankruptcy in the first place.248 However, the principle that a debtor is
entitled to come out of the bankruptcy process with the slate wiped clean
derives from the fact that a debtor, under the Bankruptcy Act, 249 was
required to surrender his non-exempt assets in bankruptcy. 250 This
problem does not apply to the same degree in Chapter 13 cases since
debtors do not surrender their assets, as they do in Chapter 7 liquidation
cases, but rather pay a percentage of their outstanding debts from their
future income. 251 This does not suggest that a Chapter 13 debtor, who

245. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)-(c). Various circuit courts have interpreted the "reasonable
time" limitation to extend far beyond one year after the final order is entered. See, e.g., In re Ruehle,
412 F.3d at 681-82; In re Hanson, 397 F.3d at 484; In re Poland, 382 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (10th Cir.
2004).
246. See supraPart IV.D.I.
247. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) ("[tlhe principal purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor') (quoting
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991)); Grogan,498 U.S. at 286-87 (noting that "a central
purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their
affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt' (quoting Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934))).
248. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
249. See supra text accompanying note 26.
250. See Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
251. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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receives a discharge of his student loan debts, is not entitled to the peace
of mind in knowing that the unpaid balances on his loans, that were
supposedly discharged, will not come back to haunt him years after
discharge. In fact, there should be a strict, definite time limitation
whereby a creditor waives his right to collaterally attack a final order of
the bankruptcy court, regardless of the purpose for seeking relief from
the order. The analysis does, however, suggest that a Chapter 13 debtor
who completes plan payments derives an economic advantage over his
counterpart Chapter 7 debtor who had his non-exempt assets liquidated
in bankruptcy, and therefore is less deserving of a fresh start than a
debtor without assets.

2. Allowing a Chapter 13 Debtor to Obtain a Discharge of an
Otherwise Non-dischargeable Debt Promotes Unethical Legal
Practices by Bankruptcy Attorneys
Attorneys owe their clients a duty to zealously advocate in their
client's interests.252 By the same token, however, attorneys may not
abuse legal procedure.2 53 If confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan containing
a provision which is in contravention to the Bankruptcy Rules is given
preclusive effect, a bankruptcy attorney, knowing the possibility of such
a procedural windfall, may find it extremely difficult to juggle these two
ethical obligations. Although bankruptcy attorneys are not required 2 to
"press for every advantage that might be realized for a client," 54
bankruptcy attorneys will likely risk discipline for overzealous advocacy
than fail to utilize any potential advantage for the benefit of their
clients.255 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the tremendous
rise in the number of debtors seeking to improperly discharge nondischargeable debt after the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
granted preclusive effect to the respective orders of the court confirming
discharge of non-dischargeable debt.256 This overzealous advocacy of
the debtor's interests effectively eradicates the Code's provision which
makes student loans non-dischargeable absent a showing of "undue

252.

253.
254.
255.
sanction
the great
256.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007).

Id. at3.1 cmt. 1.
Id. at 1.3 cmt. 1.
See Driscoll, supra note 15, at 1334 (stating that there was only one published attempt to
an attorney for seeking a discharge not permitted by the Bankruptcy Rules in contrast with
number of bankruptcy filings on an annual basis).
In re Banks, 299 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2002).
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hardship" and encourages bankruptcy attorneys to circumvent the
bankruptcy laws.
Although securing finality in a bankruptcy order granting discharge
of a student loan debt certainly furthers the goal of bankruptcy in wiping
the debtor's slate clean upon completion of the bankruptcy case, the
interests in protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system by deterring
unethical advocacy practice outweigh the interests in providing the
debtor a fresh start where the bankruptcy case did not liquidate the
debtor's non-exempt assets.
The Supreme Court can avoid having to compromise interests of
the debtor, the creditor and the bankruptcy court, however, by
eliminating the heightened notice requirement altogether, and adopting
the notice requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2002257 for proceedings to
determine the dischargeability of any debt. Such a rule would clarify the
proper procedure for discharging a student loan debt and simultaneously
comport with the requirements of due process.

V.

CONCLUSION

As the preceding argument demonstrated, if the debtor mails a copy
of a Chapter 13 plan, which clearly apprises the creditor: (1) of the debts
which the debtor wishes to discharge; (2) that subsequent confirmation
by the court will satisfy the "undue hardship" requirement of the Code;
and (3) of the potential res judicata effect of its confirmation, to the
creditor, the due process rights of the creditor are not compromised. Any
additional procedural safeguards are excessive and unnecessary since the
creditor is afforded ample opportunity to appear and raise objections to a
Chapter 13 plan which the creditor believes is inconsistent with the
bankruptcy laws. Just as general notice is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the mailing of an order of relief and notice of a
confirmation hearing, which already has the potential of discharging
most debts, such notice should be sufficient where the debtor requests
that the bankruptcy court determine the dischargeability of a debt. The
Bankruptcy Rules should not distinguish between the notice required to
commence an adversary hearing and the notice necessary to confirm a
Chapter 13 plan. As a result, a final order confirming such a plan will be
afforded preclusive effect since the due process issues are resolved.
257. This Rule requires that a clerk of the court provide notice of the confirmation hearing and
the time fixed for filing an objection by mail, as opposed to personal service. See FED. R. BANKR. P.
2002(b).
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Finally, the debtor will be given his fresh start and the integrity of the
bankruptcy system will be protected.
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